Domestic Violence Impacts of the REAL ID Act

Destruction of Address Confidentiality Protection

REAL ID § 202(b) describes what minimum information must be on a drivers license or identity card:

(1) The person's full legal name.
(2) The person's date of birth.
(3) The person's gender.
(4) The person's driver's license or identification card number.
(5) A digital photograph of the person.
(6) The person's address of principle residence.
(7) The person's signature.
(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes.
(9) A common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements.

Requiring principal places of residence effectively destroys many state address confidentiality programs. Address confidentiality programs are run by several states for survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault. Individuals are given a mailbox with their secretary of state or attorney general who forwards mail on to the individual. This address can also be used for official business with the state such as voter registration or service of process. Thus many state records will not have the real address of survivors of domestic assault. Perpetrators will not be able to use these records, or the many private sector databases that mirror these records, in locating their target.

The harm to the destruction of these address confidentiality programs is magnified by other provisions in REAL ID. As described below, REAL ID also increases the potential for collection and sharing of driver's license information in state and private sector databases. For a list of the states with address confidentiality programs, see this page by the National Conference of State Legislatures.

The Violence Against Women Act of 2005 (VAWA) required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to "consider and address the needs" of survivors whose addresses are entitled to be confidential pursuant to state or federal law. VAWA § 827. This does not guarantee that address confidentiality programs will survive the DHS regulations. The confidentiality of addresses will thus depend on how DHS interprets this command in issuing REAL ID regulations. However, this limitation will only protect those who are part of official confidentiality programs or court orders. Those who are not eligible for these programs because they did not suffer enough victimization, or those who find confidentiality without these official programs will not be protected.[From Electronic Privacy Info. Center ]

UPDATE: Homeland Security may also require the use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology in the cards as part of the “common machine readable technology,” which means the sensitive data would be transmitted wirelessly and vulnerable to interception by third parties. The agency is considering “vicinity read” or “long range” RFID tags even though the longer distance increases the risks of security and privacy problems associated with the wireless technology: clandestine tracking, loss of control of data by cardholder, and interception of data by unauthorized individuals. (Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Notice of proposed rulemaking: Minimum Standards for Driver’s licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes (Mar. 1, 2007) at 94; for more information on the privacy and security risks associated with the use of radio frequency identification technology, see EPIC’s page on RFID.) [Update from Electronic Privacy Info. Center)]